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RECENT TRENDS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
A LooK BEHIND THE LABEL OF SENTENCING
The United States Supreme Court has recognized
that the label that attaches to a criminal statute or
procedure should not be determinative of which due
process guarantees must be afforded a defendant.'
However, two recent federal court decisions
2 have
determined that one such guarantee, embodied in the
vagueness doctrine, is inapplicable to Title X of the
Federal Organized Crime Control Act.
2 These deci-
sions were supported largely by attaching to the
statute the label of sentencing. Since sentencing
procedures normally involve unchecked judicial dis-
cretion, 4 the reasoning of the courts in these two cases
suggests a disturbing trend toward denying due
process rights under two-tiered statutes merely
because they are labeled as sentencing statutes.
Williams v. New York 5 marked a recognition by
the Supreme Court that not all due process guaran-
tees must be incorporated into sentencing procedures.
Upon finding Williams guilty of first degree murder,
the jury had recommended a sentence of life im-
prisonment rather than death. ' Under then appli-
cable New York law, the death sentence was auto-
matically imposed unless the jury recommended a
sentence of life imprisonment; the judge had discre-
tion whether to follow the jury's recommendation.
The judge chose to sentence Williams to death,
despite the jury's recommendation. '
'This principle is illustrated by three cases since 1966:
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975); Specht v.
Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania,
382 U.S. 399 (1966).
'United States v. Stewart, 531 F.2d 326 (6th Cir.
1976); United States v. Holt, 397 F. Supp. 1397 (N.D.
Tex. 1975). But see United States v. Duardi, 384 F.
Supp. 874 (W.D. Mo. 1974) (alternative holding), aff'd
on other grounds, 529 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1975).
'18 U.S.C. §§ 3575-3578 (1970).
4 Coffee, The Future of Sentencing Reform: Emerging
Legal Issues in the Individualization of Justice, 73 MICH.
L. REV. 1362 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Coffee]; Frankel,
Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CINN. L. REV. 1, 4 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Frankel]; Murrah & Rubin, Penal
Reform and the Model Sentencing Act, 65 COLUht. L. REV.
1167, 1172-73 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Murrah &
Rubin].
'337 U.S. 241 (1949).
'Id. at 242.
7 1d. at 244.
Williams challenged his sentence because it had
been based on information contained in a pre-sen-
tence report which had been supplied by witnesses
whom he was unable to confront, cross-examine, or
rebut. s The Supreme Court rejected this argument,
holding that sentencing procedure need not be frozen
into the trial mold of evidential procedure. 'In reach-
ing this decision the Court noted the historical tradi-
tion of granting to the judge wide discretion in the
sources of evidence which could be used to aid in de-
termining the proper sentence. to The Court also
based its decision on the ground that "sound prac-
tical reasons" dictated the need for distinguishing
trial and sentencing procedures. " Unlike the trial,
where the issue is narrowly confined to the ques-
tion of guilt, a sentencing judge's task is to deter-
mine the appropriate punishment. According to the
Court, this task requires that the sentencing judge
have available "the fullest information possible con-
cerning the defendant's life and characteristics." 12
The Court feared that proper sentencing would be
thwarted if a judge were confined to the restrictive
rules of evidence used at a trial. It is important to
note that despite the result reached, the Court did
not make its decision until it had first analyzed the
purposes of the sentencing procedure and the pur-
poses of the due process rules which were relied upon
in making the challenge, and had found them in-
compatible.
The Supreme Court has refused to extend the
result in Williams to all sentencing proceedings. In
Specht v. Patterson" the Court considered the
constitutionality of the Colorado Sex Offenders
Act. " This Act provided for extended sentences to
defendants convicted of certain sex offenses who were
found to constitute a threat of bodily harm to the
public, or were habitual offenders, or were mentally
ill. " The defendant in Specht was convicted of
indecent liberties, which carried a maximum sen-







13386 U.S. 605 (1967).
"CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 39-19-1 to 10 (1963).
151d.
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Offenders Act to an indeterminate term of from one
day to life. He attacked the procedure of the Act
because it provided for an increased term based on
hearsay evidence, without a hearing, thus giving him
no chance to cross-examine adverse witnesses or to
present his own evidence through compulsory pro-
cess. 1" The Court declared that it would adhere to
Williams, but declined to extend it to this situation.
It found that the Sex Offenders Act did not make
commission of an offense the basis of sentencing.
Rather, the Act made conviction the basis for
commencing a new proceeding to determine new
issues of fact that were not ingredients of the offense
charged. The punishment imposed was criminal,
even though it was designed to protect the public
rather than to provide retribution. 17 The Court
determined that the procedure involved the making
of a new charge leading to criminal punishment;
therefore the defendant must receive notice and an
opportunity to be heard as well as other due process
guarantees. 18 The essential aspect of this decision is
that the Court looked through the sentencing label
attached to the statute and recognized that the
procedure involved more than ordinary sentencing,
thus requiring different treatment.
The Supreme Court in Mullaney v. Wilbur"9
again refused to allow the label of a statute to
determine which procedural safeguards need be
applied. In Mullaney the Court considered the
validity of Maine's requirement that a defendant
seeking to reduce his offense from murder to man-
slaughter bear the burden of proving that he acted in
the heat of passion after sudden provocation. The
Court felt itself bound by the statutory interpretation
of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, which held
that murder and manslaughter are both categories of
the same generic offense of felonious homicide and
that the heat of passion was merely a mitigating
factor to be taken into account after guilt for the
generic offense had already been determined. 20 But
although the Supreme Court accepted this interpre-
tation, it rejected the corollary that since heat of
passion was merely a mitigating factor, the state need
not bear the burden of proving its absence. The
16386 U.S. 605, 608 (1967).
I1d. at 608-09.
181d. at 610. The Court specified that the rights to have
counsel present, to have an opportunity to be heard, to
confront witnesses, to cross-examine, to offer evidence using
compulsory process, and to have meaningful findings by the
court were necessary to due process.
19421 U.S. 684 (1975).
211d. at 691-92.
Supreme Court argued that the Maine analysis failed
to recognize that the criminal law of Maine was
"concerned not only with guilt or innocence in the
abstract but also with the degree of criminal culpabil-
ity."' 21 The essence of the Court's holding was that
the state could not avoid due process in imposing
additional penalties merely because the defendant
had already been found guilty of one crime. It refused
to allow the requirements of due process to be
discarded merely because the state chose to character-
ize elements of a crime as different punishment
categories. 22
Williams, Specht, and Mullaney all used a func-
tional approach to determine whether due process
guarantees should apply in a given situation. That is,
the Court looked to the needs of the state and the
defendant in each situation. In each case the purposes
behind the due process guarantee were examined to
determine if the guarantee should apply in the
particular situation. None of the cases looked solely
at the label of the statute to determine what guaran-
tees should apply.
This functional approach should be used in exam-
ining the constitutionality of Title X of the Federal
Organized Crime Control Act. 23 Title X allows a
judge to impose an extended penalty 2' on a defendant
convicted of a felony (or triggering offense) and found
to be a dangerous special offender. 25 A special
offender is defined as a recidivist, 26 or one who is
2'1 d. at 697-98.221d. at 698.
2318 U.S.C. §§ 3575-3578 (1970).
24The penalties imposed under Title X may be up to
twenty-five years, but are not to be disproportionate in
severity to the maximum penalty provided for the offense of
which the defendant was originally convicted. 18 U.S.C. §
3575(b) (1970).
2518 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1970).
26 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1) (1970). This section provides:
(e) A defendant is a special offender for purposes of
this section if-(1) the defendant has previously been
convicted in courts of the United States, a State, the
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, a territory or possession of the United States,
any political subdivision, or any department, agency,
or instrumentality thereof for two or more offenses
committed on occasions different from one another
and from such felony and punishable in such courts by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year, for one
or more of such convictions the defendant has been
imprisoned prior to the commission of such felony,
and less than five years have elapsed between the
commission of such felony and either the defendant's
release, on parole or otherwise, from imprisonment
for one such conviction or his commission of the last
such previous offense or another offense punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year under
19761
COMMENTS
considered to be a professional criminal because of
the circumstances surrounding the commission of the
triggering felony. 2 A dangerous offender is one who
is found to present a serious threat of continued
criminal activity unless an extended prison term is
imposed. 8 A defendant must be found to fit both the
special offender and the dangerous offender cate-
gories in order to be sentenced under the Act.
2 9
The Act follows the lead of the Model Sentencing
Act 30 and the Model Penal Code3 ' by imposing
increased sentences on those who constitute a serious
threat to the community. Like the Model Sentencing
Act and the Model Penal Code, Title X establishes
criteria for a uniform application of sentencing
policy. 32 However, the Organized Crime Control Act
poses serious constitutional questions concerning
which due process guarantees must be accorded a
defendant before he can be subjected to the Act's
penalties. "
applicable laws of the United States, a State, the
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, a territory or possession of the United States,
any political subdivision, or any department, agency
or instrumentality thereof.
2718 U.S.C. §§ 3575(e) (2), 3575(e) (3) (1970). These
sections provide that a defendant is a special offender if:
(2) the defendant committed such felony as part of a
pattern of conduct which was criminal under applica-
ble laws of any jurisdiction, which constituted a
substantial source of his income, and in which he
manifested special skill or expertise; or
(3) such felony was, or the defendant committed
such felony in furtherance of, a conspiracy with three
or more other persons to engage in a pattern of
conduct criminal under applicable laws of any juris-
diction, and the defendant did, or agreed that he
would initiate, organize, plan, finance, direct, man-
age, or supervise all or part of such conspiracy or
conduct, or give or receive a bribe or use force as all or
part of such conduct.
2818 U.S.C. § 3575(0 (1970). This section provides:
A defendant is dangerous for purposes of this section if
a period of confinement longer than that provided for
such felony is required for the protection of the public
from further criminal conduct by the defendant.
2
9 United States v. Kelly, 384 F. Supp. 1394, 1398
(W.D. Mo. 1974), af'd 519 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Duardi, 384 F. Supp. 856, 860 (W.D. Mo.
1973) (alternative holding), affd on other grounds, 529
F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1975).
3
0COUNCIL OF JUDGES OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON
CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, MODEL SENTENCING ACT, §§ 5,
6 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter MODEL SENTENCING ACT].
"
1
MODEL PENAL CODE, §§ 7.03, 7.04 (Tent. Draft,
1962).
32Murrah & Rubin, supra note 4, at 1170-73.
33Title X imposes some procedural safeguards. Section
3575(a) requires notice of the prosecutor's intention to seek
an extended sentence under this Act prior to trial or the
One aspect of due process which has been the
subject of conflicting holdings "' is the vagueness
doctrine. This doctrine was established by the
Supreme Court in Lanzetta v. New Jersey,3 5 which
dealt with a New Jersey statute making it a criminal
offense to be a "gangster." ' 3 The Court found the
statutory definition of the term "gangster" to be
unconstitutionally vague. 37 It based the vagueness
test upon "ordinary notions of fair play and settled
rules of law . . . " which required the "terms of a
penal statute creating a new offense [to] be suffi-
ciently explicit to inform those subject to it what
conduct on their part will render them liable to its
penalities .... ,3
In a later case the Supreme Court made it clear
that the requirement of a precise statutory definition
of offenses was not to be avoided simply by changing
the statute's label. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania
3
1
involved a Pennsylvania statute which allowed juries
to impose trial costs upon an acquitted defendant in a
criminal case. This power was restricted by court
decisions to allowing the jury to impose costs only if
it found the defendant's conduct "reprehensible ...
improper . . . outrageous . . . " or where, though
acquitted, his innocence was doubtful. '0 The Court
found that even with these restrictions, the law was
acceptance by the court of a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere. The notice must specify that the prosecutor
believes the defendant to be a dangerous special offender
and must set out particular reasons for the belief. Section
3575(b) requires a hearing to determine whether the
defendant is a dangerous special offender. At the hearing
the defendant is entitled to be represented by counsel. The
defense counsel or unrepresented defendant may inspect the
presentence report sufficiently in advance of the hearing to
permit verification. At the hearing the defendant is entitled
to cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses using
compulsory process. The court is required to place its
findings on record and identify the information relied upon
in making the findings. Section 3576 allows for appellate
review of the trial court's findings. Review may encompass
the procedure involved and the questions of whether the
findings were clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion.
3 Cases cited note 2, supra.
36306 U.S. 451 (1939).
"N.J. Laws ch. 155, § 4 (1934). Section 5 of the Act
defined a gangster to be:
Any person, not engaged in any lawful occupation,
known to be a member of any gang consisting of two
or more persons, who has been convicted at least three
times of being a disorderly person, or who has been
convicted of any crime, in this or any other state. ...
37306 U.S. at 458.
38 Id. at 453.
39382 U.S. 399 (1966).
4 Id. at 404.
[Vol. 67
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too vague to be upheld." : It reasoned that "[iut
would be difficult if not impossible for a person to
prepare a defense against such abstract charges as
'misconduct' or 'reprehensible' conduct." 42 The
Court also rejected the argument made by the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court that the Act was not a penal
statute but was simply a method of collecting court
costs. The Supreme Court reasoned that regardless of
the label given to the statute, it provided a method of
depriving the defendant of liberty or property. The
Act was therefore required to meet due process stan-
dards, including the vagueness test. "'The applicabil-
ity of the vagueness doctrine was not to be deter-
mined by the label given to the proceeding, but rather
by a functional analysis of the vagueness doctrine and
its applicability to a given situation.
The purpose of the vagueness doctrine is essen-
tially two-fold. First, fundamental fairness requires
that those subject to a law be able to know in ad-
vance what conduct is required or prohibited. "" Sec-
ond, it is necessary that the law be definite to pre-
vent the arbitrary imposition of penalties by judges
and juries. ' The extent to which precision is re-
quired in a penal statute should be determined with
reference to these two purposes. However, one must
also look to the needs and purposes of the penal
statute itself to determine whether the vagueness
doctrine is appropriate. 4'
In light of the Supreme Court holdings, the
411d.
42/d.
43 Id., at 402. Note 8 of the majority opinion denied that
anything in its reasoning was meant to cast doubt on the
common state practice of allowing juries to fix punishment
within legally prescribed limits after finding a defendant
guilty of a crime. In a concurring opinion, however, Justice
Stewart suggested that much of the majority's reasoning
"served to cast great doubt. . . "on this practice. 382 U.S.
399, 405 (Justice Stewart, concurring).4
4Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939);
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101 (1945). In
Lanzetta the Court held: "No one may be required at peril
of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of
penal statutes." 306 U.S. at 453. In Screws the Court ex-
plained the problems of a vague statute:
The constitutional vice in such a statute is the essential
injustice to the accused of placing him on trial for an
offense, the nature of which the statute does not define
and hence of which it gives no warning.
41325 U.S. at 101. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S.
399, 402-03 (1966); Boyce Motor Lines v. United States,
342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952).
4"Cf., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). The
basis of the Williams decision was that rules of evidence
used at trial were incompatible with the needs and purposes
of sentencing procedure.
method used to determine the applicability of the
vagueness test to Title X in recent federal court
decisions seems somewhat surprising. United States
v. Duardi,47 United States v. Holt,48 and United
States v. Stewart44 reached varied results, but none of
the cases used the functional approach dictated by
Williams, " Specht," and Mullaney52 in order to
determine whether the Act was a sentencing statute
or whether it actually defined new elements of a
crime. None of the cases discussed whether Title X
gave adequate warning of its prohibitions or was
specific enough to prevent arbitrary application.
In Duardi, the first case to consider the vagueness
question in relation to Title X, the court questioned
whether the condition that an offender be found
dangerous was sufficiently definite to meet the
requirements of the vagueness test and due process. 53
Quoting extensively from Lanzetta 14 and Giaccio, "
the court ruled that the statute did not meet the
vagueness test, but failed to consider that while the
New Jersey statute56 considered in Lanzetta was a
crime-defining statute, Title X purports to be a
sentencing statute. The court also failed to explain
specifically what was unfairly vague about the
definition of dangerousness. While the court could
have reached the same result by the use of a
functional analysis, its major fault was that it failed
even to question whether the vagueness test should
apply.
In Holt, the court gave little consideration to
Duardi. It simply noted that while the statute
57
considered in Lanzetta made it criminal to be a
gangster, Title X does not make it a crime to be
dangerous. Rather, the court argued, Title X speci-
fies special handling for defendants already convicted
of violating the law. 58 The court then drew an
analogy between the special handling under Title X
and that accorded to dangerous defendants who are
denied bail under 18 U.S.C. § 3148. " The court
47384 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Mo. 1974) (alternative
holding), aff'd on other grounds, 529 F.2d 123 (8th Cir.
1975).
48397 F. Supp. 1397 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
49531 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1976).
30337 U.S. 241 (1949).
51386 U.S. 605 (1967).
52421 U.S. 684 (1975).
5'384 F. Supp. 874, 885 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
54306 U.S. 451 (1939).
"5382 U.S. 399 (1966).
56N.J. Laws ch. 155, §§ 4, 5 (1934).
57 Id.
58397 F. Supp. 1397, 1399 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
5918 U.S.C. § 3148 (1970) provides:
19761
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noted that in construing the bail statute in Sellers v.
United States, 60 Mr. Justice Black was "not troubled
by the lack of precise definition of the statutory word
'dangerous'." 61 But the Holt opinion failed to con-
sider whether the purposes behind the vagueness test
might not be as applicable to Title X as to a crime
defining statute. Holt also failed to consider whether
there might be a distinction between statutes impos-
ing increased sentences for specified categories of
defendants and one which denies bail to dangerous
defendants. While one imposes a prison term of up to
twenty-five years, the other only denies bail to a
defendant until his trial, while awaiting sentence,
sentence review, or during appeal.
In Stewart, Title X was challenged as being
unconstitutionally vague in both its application and
sentencing provisions. The defendant first argued
that the length of sentence provision 62 was so
indefinite the defendant could not be sentenced
without a denial of due process. The term "danger-
ous" was attacked as being unconstitutionally vague.
In rejecting the first contention, the Sixth Circuit
noted that the provision requiring that the extended
sentence not be disproportionate to the maximum
sentence for the triggering offense was enacted to
guarantee that the extended sentence would not
"represent in effect a penalty for a different crime or
crimes." 63 The court noted that Title X had pro-
vided procedural safeguards far in excess of those or-
dinarily used in sentencing. Finally, the court noted
A person (1) who is charged with an offense
punishable by death, or (2) who has been convicted of
an offense and is either awaiting sentence or sentence
review under section 3576 of this title or has filed an
appeal or a petition for a writ of certiorari, shall be
treated in accordance with the provisions of section
3146 unless the court or judge has reason to believe
that no one or more conditions of release will
reasonably assure that the person will not flee or pose
a danger to any other person or to the community. If
such a risk of flight or danger is believed to exist, or if
it appears that an appeal is frivolous or taken for
delay, the person may be ordered detained. The
provisions of section 3147 shall not apply to persons
described in this section: Provided, That other rights
to judicial review of conditions of release or orders of
detention shall not be affected. As amended Pub. L.
91-452, Title X, § 1002, Oct. 15, 1970, 84 Stat. 952.
1089 S. Ct. 36 (Black, Circuit Justice, 1968).
61397 F. Supp. at 1399.
6218 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1970). See note 24 supra.
63531 F.2d 326, 330 (6th Cir. 1976). Unless one resorts
to line drawing it is hard to see why any increased penalty
under Title X's criteria does not establish a penalty for a
different crime or crimes.
that judges had long exercised great discretion in
determining the length of sentences. .6
When dealing with the term "dangerous," the
Stewart court followed the path of Holt. It rejected
the holding in Duardi by stating that Title X was a
sentencing statute rather than a crime-defining stat-
ute. " Stewart borrowed terminology from Specht,
holding that Title X created a new issue rather than
a new charge. " But the court did not explain how
Title X differed from the Colorado Sex Offenders Act
which Specht held to create a new charge which
required due process protections. The Stewart opin-
ion stated that Title X provided for no more than an
increase in the penalty for the original offense67 and
that, since the conduct embraced within the criteria
must be factually related to the triggering felony, it
could not constitute a separate charge. .6 The court
did not consider whether the sentencing criteria used
by Title X could be distinguished from those consid-
erations which Mullaney" required to be shown
beyond a reasonable doubt in order to impose an
increased penalty. 7' In each case the sentencing label
was attached to conditions requiring an increased
penalty.
The court also argued that the term "dangerous,"
61Id. at 331-32
6"Id. at 332, 336. The court said:
It is important to emphasize that Title X does not
make it a criminal offense to be "dangerous," as was
the case of the NewJersey statute discussed in Duardi,
which made it unlawful to be a "gangster." Rather,
this statute is directed against criminals-not con-
victed of being "dangerous"-but of having violated a
law of the United States.
Id. at 33 6 .
"6 Id. at 332.
67Id.
6
1Id. This is a misreading of the Act. Neither the special
offender criteria nor the dangerous offender standard
requires the facts to be related to the offense originally
charged. For example, § 3575(e) (1) allows a defendant to
be found a special offender if he has previously committed
two or more felonies, neither of which needs to be related to
the charge triggering the extended sentencing proceedings.
Further, the element which Mullaney ruled must receive
due process guarantees was intimately related to the offense
charged.
69421 U.S. 684 (1975).
" Presumably, if a factor is considered to be ah element
of a crime, or has to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, it
is also subject to the vagueness test. Before something can be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt it must be sufficiently
defined to enable the fact finder and the one attempting to
prove it to know what is being proved. Unless a crime is
defined it cannot be proven. Thus, a corollary to Mul-
laney's holding would be that the standard of absence of




as used in the Act, was not a new concept in the
criminal law, citing, as did Holt, the federal provi-
sion 71 allowing a judge to deny bail to a defendant
found to be dangerous. 72 Comparing Title X to
normal sentencing procedures, where ajudge is given
no sentencing criteria, the court found that the
procedures of Title X allowed for far less arbitrary
sentencing than would normally be the case.
73
Both Stewart and Holt were content to label Title
X a sentencing statute rather than a crime-defining
statute and then summarily dismiss the vagueness
doctrine. Neither court dealt adequately with the
question of whether a new crime was created by
imposing new criteria for which added penalities
were imposed.
Mullaney 7" rejected the argument that a state
could simply define an element of a crime to be a
punishment category in order to avoid the burden of
proof. 7' GiacCio 76 similarly rejected the argument
that the vagueness doctrine could be easily dismissed
by changing the label of the statute. 77 Although
Duardi reached a different conclusion than Stewart
and Holt, it also failed to deal with the question of
whether the vagueness doctrine should apply to Title
X. It applied the doctrine mechanically, without any
insight into its basic purpose. What the Supreme
Court required, 78 and what Duardi, Holt, and
Stewart failed to provide, is a functional analysis of
Title X and how the principles of the vagueness
doctrine should apply to it. Title X provides a
method for imposing additional penalties upon a
defendant, thus depriving him of liberty. As Specht
makes clear, any such deprivation must meet the
requirements of due process, presumably including
the requirement that it not be unconstitutionally
vague. 7' To conclude that the vagueness doctrine
should not apply, some affirmative reasons must be
advanced to show why its protections should be
7118 U.S.C. § 3148.
71531 F.2d at 336.
7"Id. at 334, 335.
74421 U.S. 684 (1975).
7"See notes 19-22 and accompanying text, supra.
76382 U.S. 399 (1966).
77See notes 39-43 and accompanying text, supra.
"ILe., Williams, Specht, Mullaney, Lanzetta, and
Giaccio.
79386 U.S. 605, 608-10 (1967). In making its holding,
the Court in Specht compared the Colorado Sex Offenders
Act under consideration with recidivist statutes imposing
increased penalties on repeat offenders. Due process gua-
rantees were required in both cases because each required a
convicted defendant to face further proceedings leading to
criminal penalties.
inapplicable. "Neither Holt nor Stewart supplied any
reasons why Title X should not meet the require-
ments of the vagueness test. Nor did they show that
the vagueness test was unnecessary to protect the
defendant's rights.
One purpose behind the vagueness doctrine is to
give warning of what conduct is prohibited and what
conduct is considered more culpable than others. 81
Title X's concern about dangerousness, however, is
not related to defining prohibited conduct or the
degree of culpability for a given action. Rather, it is
concerned with predicting the defendant's probable
future conduct based on his character at the time of
sentencing.8 2 A defendant could not conform his
conduct to such a standard, and the imposition of
criminal penalties based solely on such a prediction
would certainly violate due process. However, it
would be hard to argue that such a factor should not
be taken into account in sentencing. In fact, the law
has seen many attempts to incorporate such a
prediction into sentencing. 3 For the same reasons
that the statute does not give warning to a future
offender, it would not prevent arbitrary application
by a judge. Title X does not prescribe a method for
determining when a defendant is dangerous. 84 It does
not give any indication of what would manifest a
propensity toward future criminal conduct. How-
ever, because of the nature of the task itself, i.e.,
predicting a defendant's probable future conduct, it
may be impossible to make such a determination
anything but arbitrary. 8-
8OThis was essentially the approach the Court took in
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), when it
concluded that trial evidentiary procedures were not re-
quired when deciding between a life sentence and the death
penalty for first degree murder. See discussion accompany-
ing notes 5-12 supra.
" See note 44 supra; cf Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S.
684 (1975).
"Letter from W. Wilson to Emanuel Cellar, September
9, 1970, in 2 U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD. NEws 4059, 4067
(1970).
83E.g., the recidivist statutes and sexually dangerous
persons statutes. The recidivist statutes were criticized for
imposing unduly long sentences on those who were not
really dangerous. The dangerous sex offenders statutes were
criticized for lack of uniformity in their application. See
Murrah & Rubin, supra note 4, at 1171.
8 This should be contrasted with the MODEL SENTENC-
ING ACT, supra note 30, which requires the judge to remand
the defendant to a diagnostic center to determine whether he
is suffering from a personality disorder indicating a likeli-
hood of criminal conduct.
"One approach which might reduce the arbitrariness of
this decision would be to devise a system similar to that used
by the U.S. Parole Board in making parole release
19761
Considering the serious questions raised about
Title X, why did Stewart and Holt both dismiss the
vagueness objection so lightly? The answer can be
found in the history of judicial discretion in sentenc-
ing. Generally, a judge may impose any sentence
within a prescribed maximum and minimum without
any guidelines and this discretion has not been
questioned by the Supreme Court. "When viewed in
light of this accepted practice, Title X could hardly
decisions. Like the sentencing judge under Title X, the
Board must make a decision involving a determination of
the likelihood of future criminal conduct or, more correctly,
the probability of a successful parole. The Board employs
an objective evaluation of factors relevant to predicting
future criminal activity, and a score is given to each prisoner
to determine how much of his sentence he will serve before
his parole release. Almost all of the information used by the
Parole Board in its decision is available to the judge at
sentencing. See Project: Parole Release Decisionmaking
and the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810 (1975).
" 14illiams specifically approved of the wide discretion
afforded to judges in sentencing. Williams v. New York,
337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949). In Giaccio the Court was care-
ful to make clear that it did not intend to cast any doubt on
the settled state practice of leaving juries to fix punish-
ment within legally prescribed limits. Giaccio v. Pennsyl-
vania, 382 U.S. 399,499 n. 8 (1966).
be called arbitrary. If it does not give precise
standards to guide a judge's discretion, it at least
shows the direction in which a judge ought to look.
The Act defines the broad policy to be followed in
sentencing a defendant to an extended term. Yet, as
suggested earlier, Title X goes further than ordinary
sentencing and should be subject to stricter stan-
dards.
Stewart and Holt represent a refusal to look
behind the labels to the substance of two-tiered
sentencing. This conforms to the tradition of allow-
ing complete discretion in imposing sentence. The
reasoning involved in these two cases leads to the
conclusion that other due process guarantees would
be denied in a two-tiered sentencing framework
because they are not normally found in sentencing
procedure. But this type of statute imposes added
burdens on a defendant and therefore requires due
process protection. Although the historical sentenc-
ing background is conducive to falling into the
reasoning of Holt and Stewart, it is to be hoped that
future courts will more closely examine the functions
of two-tiered sentencing and the purposes behind due
process guarantees before dismissing them as inap-
plicable.
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